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  Abstract 
Does enhancing banks’ information sets and understanding of credit risks improve 
loan loss recognition? We study this question using a global dataset of staggered 
initiations and coverage increases of public credit registries (PCRs). Mandated by 
national regulators, PCRs collect borrower and loan information from lenders and 
share it with the banks in the financial system. This setting represents a significant 
improvement in banks’ assessment of loss events. We find that PCR initiations and 
coverage reforms enhance the timeliness of banks’ loan loss recognition—the extent 
to which loan loss provisions capture subsequent nonperforming loans. The effects are 
greater when PCRs distribute more information and are not driven by changes in 
borrower quality or supervisory stringency. Overall, these inferences are consistent 
with improvements in banks’ information sets leading to better provisioning decisions. 
Keywords: credit reform, information sharing, banking, learning, loan loss provisions 
JEL Classifications: D82, G21, G28, G32, M41. 
                                                 
* We thank Brian Akins, Alex Aleszczyk, Brad Badertscher, Ray Ball, Mary Barth, Abhijit Barua (discussant), 
Anne Beatty, Phil Berger, Gauri Bhat, Matthias Breuer, Robert Bushman, Hans Christensen, Yiwei Dou, John 
Gallemore, Carlo Gallimberti, John Hand, Leslie Hodder, Zach Kaplan, Anya Kleymenova, Art Kraft, Mark 
Lang, Christian Leuz, Scott Liao, Xiumin Martin, Tathagat Mukhopadhyay, DJ Nanda, Allison Nicoletti, 
Thomas Rauter, Sugata Roychowdhury, Stephen Ryan, Jim Ryans, Catherine Schrand, Lakshmanan 
Shivakumar, Jayanthi Sunder, Shyam Sunder, Andrew Sutherland (discussant), İrem Tuna, Florin Vasvari, 
Charlie Wang, Regina Wittenberg-Moerman, Jin Xie, seminar participants at the Cass Business School, Indian 
School of Business, London Business School, and conference participants at the 2017 AAA Annual Meeting, 
2017 Colorado Summer Accounting Research Conference, and 2017 Global Issues in Accounting Conference 
for helpful comments and suggestions. Francesco Amodeo, Matthew Grosse, Maximilian Sander, and Giorgia 
Vergnano provided excellent research assistance. Financial support from the London Business School RAMD 
Fund is gratefully acknowledged. Balakrishnan is at Rice University, 6100 Main Street, Houston, TX 77005, 
US. Ertan is at the London Business School, Regent’s Park, London NW14SA, UK. 
 
 
1 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Just as the global financial system suffered the crisis of 2007–2009, many observers 
acknowledged that banks were not timely in recognizing expected defaults prior to the crisis.1 
Timeliness in loan loss provisioning has been a central topic in academic and policy discussions, 
as early recognition of loan losses through bank accruals could curb procyclicality in bank lending 
and financial stability (Beatty and Liao 2011; GAO 2013; FASB 2016). But what drives the 
variation in the timeliness of banks’ loan loss recognition (LLR), and how can this practice be 
improved? Although most arguments and current evidence revolve around banks’ incentives and 
fundamentals, banks’ understanding of credit risks also plays a crucial role in their provisioning 
decisions (Acharya and Ryan 2016).2 To date, however, there is little empirical evidence on the 
effect of banks’ ability to ascertain credit risks in their LLR practices. Our paper attempts to fill 
this gap by examining whether and how improvements in information about borrowers’ credit 
profiles influence banks’ LLR timeliness.  
In the LLR process, banks identify credit risks in their holdings and activities. Provisioning 
depends on the information banks possess, and managerial assessment is an essential part of this 
complex process, irrespective of the method employed.3 Under the incurred loss model, provisions 
                                                 
1 See, for example, Laux and Leuz (2009, 2010), Vyas (2011), Huizinga and Laeven (2012), Beck, Jakubik, and 
Piloiu (2013), GAO (2013), Beatty and Liao (2014), and Acharya and Ryan (2016). 
2 These discussions include managers’ incentives and discretion (Wahlen 1994), the use of the incurred loss 
model as opposed to alternative approaches (Laeven and Majnoni 2003; Dugan 2009), and loan composition 
(Liu and Ryan 2006). 
3 There are two primary frameworks for provisioning: incurred and expected. In most cases, including our sample 
countries, loan loss provisions are made under the incurred loss framework (US GAAP (FAS 5/FAS 114) and 
IFRS (IAS 39)). These rules do not permit provisions to include expected credit losses and do limit them to 
losses that are considered probable (e.g., borrower loss of employment, decrease in collateral values). In contrast, 
the expected loss model (e.g., IFRS 9) removes this “probable” criterion. This framework, to which banks have 
been switching, further increases the role of managerial input by requiring that banks use their evaluations and 
forecasts to estimate future credit losses (Ertan 2019). 
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should cover losses that are estimated to have been incurred but are not yet charged off (as of the 
reporting date). Accounting rules require that loan loss estimates incorporate all relevant and 
observable information, including specific evidence like a borrower’s financial health, as well as 
general changes in economic conditions that could influence default rates. Consistent with the 
subjectivity and complexity inherent in provisioning, prior academic work explores the effects of, 
and the cross-sectional variation in, banks’ LLR timeliness under the incurred loss framework 
(e.g., Beatty and Liao 2011; Bushman and Williams 2012).  
We expect that an increase in information on loss events and borrower health should help 
banks evaluate the risks better and improve their loan loss provisions.4 To test this prediction, we 
focus on a formal channel of information sharing in a cross-country setting: public credit registries 
(PCRs). Established and managed by national banking regulators, PCRs are data repositories that 
contain detailed information about individual and commercial borrowers—especially for small 
contracts and opaque borrowers (Jappelli and Pagano 1999). PCRs are launched to increase the 
information available to banks, improve provisioning decisions, and enhance supervision practices 
(Miller 2003). The main source of this data reservoir is regulated banks, which provide the registry 
with a variety of inputs ranging from borrower indebtedness and performance to subjective 
assessments like internal ratings. Credit registries include information on commercial loans as well 
as individual credit (e.g., mortgages, consumer loans, auto loans, credit cards, overdrafts). In 
return, credit registries typically share this information with the other banks in the financial 
                                                 
4 Given that loan loss provisions can be estimated for either an individual loan or a group of homogenous loans, 
our view is that the information from PCRs can be about either the overall industry/economic trends or an 
individual borrower. Industry or economic trends can be gleaned from the behavior of different borrower-type 
pools. Regarding borrower-specific information, suppose a debtor that has borrowed from two banks (Banks A 
and B) defaults on one of the loans (Bank A’s). If Bank A shares this information with Bank B, then Bank B can 
use this objective evidence to better estimate the loan loss. Information sharing would make Bank B’s loan loss 
provision timelier.  
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system.5 In summary, our study exploits regulations that lead to PCR initiations and coverage 
expansions as a shock to banks’ understanding of credit risks. This represents a significant increase 
in banks’ information set that is relevant for provisioning decisions (Acharya and Ryan 2016). 
We hand-collect the data on the establishment, coverage, and background of PCRs from the 
annual reports of national bank supervisors or central banks that are responsible for regulating 
PCRs in Europe from 2004 to 2015. Out of 23 countries with an established credit registry, 13 
experienced a PCR initiation or a change in coverage regulation during our sample period. We 
focus on the first event for each of these countries and perform a series of bank-level difference-
in-differences tests to examine changes in the timeliness of loan loss provisioning—i.e., the extent 
to which current loan provisions explicitly anticipate the deterioration in loan portfolios. 
Specifically, we examine the coefficient on next year’s change in nonperforming loans (NPLs) in 
regressions in which the dependent variable is current loan loss provisions (Bushman and Williams 
2012). An increase in this coefficient indicates an improvement in timeliness.  
PCRs are country-level establishments with mandatory participation; therefore, we can 
straightforwardly define treatment banks at the country level. We compare these banks’ LLR 
timeliness to that of banks in non-treatment countries but with similar observables over a narrow 
window of three years before and after the events. We find that mandatory information sharing 
improves banks’ LLR timeliness (by 10 percentage points). That is, information sharing brings 
forward the recognition of future changes in NPLs. This finding is robust to a variety of alternative 
specifications, such as using other measures of LLR timeliness, examining narrower event 
                                                 
5 Despite the similarities in their general framework and objectives, there is vast variation across PCRs. For 
example, some have a minimum amount threshold for loans they include, whereas others have full coverage of 
the economy. PCRs also differ from one another in the types of financial institutions they cover and the amount 
of information they collect and disseminate (see Section 2 for details). We exploit some of this cross-sectional 
variation in our analyses.  
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windows, adding controls for banks’ portfolio composition and institutional features of the 
countries, and excluding banks that experienced changes in accounting or regulatory reporting. 
Our regulation-based study faces some identification challenges. Although the mandatory 
nature of PCRs is not susceptible to selection at the bank level, such regulatory decisions are likely 
affected by country-specific features. In fact, credit reporting surveys suggest that many countries 
implement PCRs precisely because they aim to enhance banks’ information sets. Thus, we do not 
claim randomness; rather, our goal is to infer whether the treatment in question leads to the desired 
effect on the treated banks. To explore this issue further and to rule out identification concerns, we 
perform several additional tests.  
First, certain countries may be more likely to initiate PCRs than others, and inherent 
differences between the treatment and control countries—not the initiation of PCRs—could drive 
our results. The fact that the pre-PCR trends in timeliness are statistically identical for the treatment 
and control groups allays this concern. Further, the observable portion and the unobservable but 
time-invariant portion of such pre-treatment confounding factors are mitigated by a vector of 
controls, as well as country fixed effects. A second identification concern is that concurrent 
confounds may be responsible for our findings. In particular, PCR initiations could be just one part 
of broader regulatory initiatives, and this composite structure might be the correct treatment effect. 
Neither our analyses of the regulations around PCR reforms nor our conversations with 
practitioners indicate that such confounding factors occur systematically. Empirically, we control 
for country-level indices that track concurrent changes in regulatory stringency, credit reforms, 
and local economic trends. Moreover, we account for banks’ time-varying financial and regulatory 
reporting practices. 
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We argue that three channels could drive the observed treatment effect. PCRs could improve 
LLR practices by intensifying bank supervision, by systematically affecting borrower pools and 
borrower default behavior (mitigating adverse selection and moral hazard), or by enhancing banks’ 
understanding of credit risks. While these channels are not mutually exclusive, several cross-
sectional tests provide further evidence that banks’ learning is a valid mechanism. We find that 
our inferences hold for countries with increasing as well as decreasing NPLs, which indicates that 
default risk dynamics alone are unlikely to drive the results. We also note that our empirical 
approach explicitly controls for bank-level changes in NPLs, which permits us to account for 
changes in default behavior around the events we study. We also find significant results on 
subsamples comprising increases and decreases in debt maturity, which suggests that changes in 
contractual features are not responsible for our inferences.6 Our findings hold for countries with 
strong and weak levels of bank supervision. Neither bank supervision nor borrower characteristics 
can fully explain our findings, which implies that an increase in banks’ understanding of risks is 
playing a role.  
We next turn to an alternative global sample of developing countries that initiated PCRs 
between 1994 and 2008 from the World Bank’s credit reporting database to provide additional 
tests to bolster our inferences. We observe that the results documented in the European setting 
extend to this alternative setting, providing further external validity for our conclusions. In 
addition, we exploit a feature of this dataset to provide more direct evidence on the role of banks’ 
learning. In particular, this dataset allows us to examine the impact of the variation in the amount 
of information PCRs collect and distribute. We find that conditional on the amount of information 
                                                 
6 Banks’ learning from PCRs can be limited in the presence of certain contractual features, such as cross-default 
provisions, which are typically prevalent in large corporate loans. To speak to this issue, we examine the results 
among countries with high and low levels of corporate debt. Our conclusions hold in both subsamples. 
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the PCR collects, the amount it distributes has a significant effect on LLR timeliness. By holding 
information collection and supervisory effects constant, this test suggests that banks’ receipt and 
use of PCR information drive the treatment effect. Overall, these inferences add credibility to our 
claims that banks’ understanding of credit risks is a channel through which information sharing 
enhances banks’ LLR practices.7  
Our study extends the literature on the determinants of banks’ LLR timeliness. Researchers 
have pointed out the need for a better understanding of loan loss provisioning practices (Beatty 
and Liao 2014; Bushman 2014), particularly because banks’ reporting and disclosure practices 
have significant implications for the economy (e.g., Beatty and Liao 2011; Granja 2018; 
Balakrishnan and Ertan 2018, 2019). The literature has thus far focused on managerial incentives 
and economic factors, such as loan portfolio composition. In this line of work, the implicit 
assumption is that managers need to be incentivized and monitored to make better decisions (e.g., 
Altamuro and Beatty 2010; Beatty and Liao 2011; Bushman and Williams 2012, 2015). We 
contribute to these efforts by documenting that banks’ ability to ascertain loan losses can also 
enhance their LLR practices. Our focus on external information extends the findings of Bhat, Ryan, 
and Vyas (2018), who report a link between banks’ voluntary disclosure of credit risk models and 
timeliness of loan loss provisions.8 
Our findings also speak to the work on credit information sharing, which is ever more 
prevalent given the unprecedented pace and cost-effectiveness of data collection and management. 
                                                 
7 Information sharing may also affect provisioning by improving banks’ screening. To be sure, this explanation 
is a variant of the learning channel that we propose. Nevertheless, our findings are not an artifact of more efficient 
contracts or improved screening to the extent that our research design directly accounts for changes in NPLs.  
8 Acharya and Ryan (2016) note that the disclosure decision could be confounded and that these disclosures 
serve as noisy proxies of the available information. These critical issues are less of a concern in our setting. 
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Economists have pointed out the benefits of information sharing among lenders for the availability 
and quality of credit (e.g., Jappelli and Pagano 1999; Miller 2003). More recently, Sutherland 
(2018) finds that the establishment of a private credit bureau in the U.S. has reduced relationship-
switching costs for borrowers and relationship-specific investments for lenders. Liberti, Sturgess, 
and Sutherland (2018) examine the staggered voluntary entries of commercial lenders into a U.S. 
commercial credit bureau and report that lenders leverage their collateral expertise to enter new 
markets after joining this structure. Unlike this strand of the literature, we explore the effects of 
information sharing on banks’ accounting decisions, and we propose banks’ ability to better 
evaluate credit risks as a specific channel.  
Finally, the insights we provide also fit squarely within the debate over whether and with 
whom bank information should be shared. Recent theoretical work questions the conventional 
wisdom that greater disclosure is desirable and argues that increasing bank disclosures could harm 
the stability of the financial system (e.g., Goldstein and Sapra 2014; Dang, Gorton, Holmstrom, 
and Ordonez 2017). One nuance that this line of research has not considered is the sharing of 
information with a subset of market participants (e.g., peer banks), rather than the public. Our 
paper provides a bridge between the studies arguing for and against bank transparency. 
Several caveats are in order. While our findings indicate the benefits of PCRs, the exchange 
of information is not without costs. For example, banks may choose to ration credit to riskier 
borrowers with positive net-present-value projects; therefore, our conclusions do not imply an 
improvement in social welfare. Further, one would need to incorporate the variation in the existing 
institutional framework to generalize our results to a broader set of countries—especially for the 
inferences from the global sample. Other fundamental elements of information regulation, such as 
enforcement, commitment, and political support, remain critical. 
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BACKGROUND AND HYPOTHESES 
Public Credit Registries: Institutional Overview 
The first countries to start public credit registries (PCRs) were in Western Europe—Germany 
in 1934, followed by France in 1946. Since then, more than 90 countries set up PCRs, and which 
often facilitate borrower-level information sharing across banks (Djankov, McLeish, and Shleifer 
2007).9 As noted by Jappelli and Pagano (2000), the Committee of Governors of the European 
Central Bank defines a PCR as “an information system designed to provide commercial banks, 
central banks, and other supervisory authorities with information about the indebtedness of firms 
and individuals vis-à-vis the whole banking system.” Thus, PCRs are aimed at capturing loans to 
individuals and businesses alike. The extent of the coverage varies across PCRs and is dictated by 
a pre-set minimum threshold of loan values for reporting. The information PCRs contain is 
substantial. Banks and sometimes non-bank lenders are required to report on a regular basis, 
usually monthly. Typically, information on borrowers is requested regardless of their standing; 
hence, PCRs contain both positive information (i.e., successful payments) and negative 
information (i.e., missed payments). 
PCRs across the globe share a basic framework in their institutional structure. They are 
managed and controlled by the national banking regulator, which is often the central bank. 
Typically, regulated financial institutions are required to participate in PCRs. Noncompliance is 
sanctioned by supervisory actions, penalty fees, public disclosure of noncompliance, and denial of 
                                                 
9 Source: World Bank Doing Business (2015). In addition, most countries are considering starting a PCR. For 
instance, in 2017 India began deliberations about launching one.  
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PCR data access (Miller 2003). For example, according to Ordinance 22 Article 26 of the 
Bulgarian National Bank (BNB), the administrator of the Bulgarian PCR, 
If an institution under Article 4 does not submit the monthly information to the Central 
Credit Register within the set time limits under Article 10, paragraph 3 or submits 
information which does not meet the requirements of this Ordinance, the BNB shall 
discontinue its access to the Central Credit Register for information about credit 
indebtedness of its customers until provision of the relevant information. 
To ensure data accuracy, the regulator or central bank takes several steps, including data 
quality checks and on-site examination. Continuing with the example of the Bulgarian registry, 
BNB Ordinance 22 Article 25 states that  
The Bulgarian National Bank shall control the compliance with the terms and 
procedure for providing and using information from the Central Credit. The Bulgarian 
National Bank may require additional information or any documents related to the 
control exercised under Article 1, and may also carry out on-site examinations.  
In addition to such verification measures, regulators also enforce compliance with fines or 
sanctions. For instance, BNB Ordinance 22 Article 27 states: “Where an infringement of this 
Ordinance by the institutions under Article 4 is identified, the sanctions, fines and supervisory 
measures provided for in the Law of Credit Institutions shall be imposed.” Nevertheless, these 
actions do not imply full accuracy of all the data fields that banks submit to the PCR (e.g., 
Giannetti, Liberti, and Sturgess 2017), and inaccuracies would diminish the effect of information 
sharing.  
According to the survey evidence provided by Miller (2003), PCRs are intended to increase 
the amount of borrower information available to lenders, to improve banks’ provisioning 
decisions, and to enhance supervision by providing additional inputs to the regulator. Some 
countries were motivated by the idea that financial institutions should know the indebtedness and 
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creditworthiness of existing and potential borrowers in the whole financial system in order to make 
more informed lending and provisioning decisions. Consistent with this view, World Bank Credit 
Reporting surveys indicate that almost all banks use the registry data for lending.10 The supervisory 
purpose of PCRs relies on the regulator’s identification of the main debtors in the financial system, 
analysis of concentration exposures, and monitoring and enforcement of banks’ provisioning 
policies against problem loans.  
Although PCRs share many characteristics, there are also significant differences across 
jurisdictions. Foremost among these differences are the specifics of the information collected, the 
coverage of the economy, and the accessibility of the data. All PCRs collect basic data about 
borrowers, such as their name and contact details and information on outstanding loan amounts, 
type, and defaults. Some PCRs, however, populate additional fields, such as (commercial) 
borrowers’ financial statements, the value of collateral, and even tax returns or internal bank 
ratings. For example, the Austrian registry gathers information on interest rates, maturity, and 
collateral, while in the Czech Republic and Germany, PCR information is limited to loan type and 
outstanding indebtedness. Credit registries also differ in the minimum loan size above which the 
information on the loans must be provided to the PCRs. While some PCRs, such as Slovakia’s, 
have a minimum threshold of zero and capture all loans, other PCRs limit their focus to larger 
loans that pose a major risk to the financial system. For example, the German Credit Registry 
collects data only on credit exposures of at least one million euros.  
 
                                                 
10 Further, bankers indicate in these surveys that credit reporting information is potentially a more important 
measure of creditworthiness than collateral, the borrower’s financial standing, and the borrower’s relationship 
with the bank (see Graph 4 in Miller 2000 and Figure 1.4 in Miller 2003).  
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Information Sharing and Loan Loss Provisioning: Predictions 
Early academic work concentrates on the conditions under which information sharing can 
mitigate the information asymmetry between borrowers and lenders.11 PCRs could improve banks’ 
knowledge of the applicant and allow lenders to more efficiently target and price their loans 
(Padilla and Pagano 1997; Pagano and Jappelli 1993). Registries could also work as a disciplining 
device by inducing borrowers to avoid strategic default (Padilla and Pagano 1997; Jappelli and 
Pagano 2002). What is relatively unexplored in this literature is the direct role of PCRs in 
improving banks’ evaluation of credit risks (Kallberg and Udell 2003). More generally, extant 
research has also linked the existence of a PCR with the absence of significant private credit 
bureaus, weak creditor protection, and a French civil code legal system. Powell, Mylenko, Miller, 
and Majnoni (2004) suggest that regardless of the initial motivation, PCRs are often used for a 
variety of purposes beyond their original objectives. The authors also point out that loan loss 
provisioning can be improved by information sharing.  
In order to appreciate how PCRs and an enhanced information environment could affect 
LLR practices, it is useful to explore how banks make provisions. At the heart of loan loss 
provisioning is information about the creditworthiness of a borrower at a given point in time. The 
objective of the incurred loss model—the predominant framework in our sample—is to set aside 
a reserve for losses on loans that have likely been incurred as of the balance sheet date but have 
not yet been charged off. These accounting rules require that loan loss estimates incorporate all 
                                                 
11 Since the borrower is more informed about its financial position and future profitability than the lender, who 
has a limited ability to assess the associated credit risk, borrowers with worse prospects (adverse selection: 
Akerlof 1970; Leland and Pyle 1977) and those that do not intend to honor the contract (moral hazard: Diamond 
1984, 1991; Holmstrom and Tirole 1997) dominate the market. Thus, centralized exchanges of credit information 
among banks and supervisors can mitigate both problems to the extent that such exchanges sidestep costly 
information production (Hirshleifer 1971). 
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observable data on losses, such as a specific borrower experiencing financial difficulties and 
general economic conditions that could change default rates.12 Put differently, banks recognize 
loan losses upon discovering a borrower’s loss event that indicates possible future defaults. LLR 
depends on the objective evidence that the bank has about the borrower’s health at the time of the 
balance sheet date, and the identification of loss events is complicated and subjective. For these 
reasons, it is inherently difficult to recognize existing credit losses earlier in the credit cycle.13  
Accordingly, a positive shock to the objective evidence banks possess about loss events and 
borrower creditworthiness—like the information supplied by PCRs—could enhance managers’ 
estimates of loan loss provisions. These inputs could reveal trends about the macroeconomy or 
pertain to specific borrowers. Systematic trends can be gleaned from the behavior of different 
borrower pools. Information relating to specific borrowers is often obtained directly from other 
banks. If an individual/entity that had borrowed from Bank A defaults on its loans, all other banks 
in the same country gain access to this information. Accordingly, if Bank B had also extended 
loans to this borrower, even if these loans are performing, Bank B can use this objective evidence 
to better estimate its loan losses. In this sense, information sharing would make Bank B’s loan loss 
provision timelier. Even though shedding light on the precise nature of learning is beyond the 
scope of our paper, our conversations with bankers who rely on PCR data suggest that this 
information is used in a borrower-specific context. 
                                                 
12 For example, IAS 39 states that “Objective evidence that a financial asset or group of assets is impaired 
includes observable data that comes to the attention of the holder of the asset about the following loss events: 
(a) significant financial difficulty of the issuer or obligor; (b) a breach of contract, such as a default or 
delinquency in interest or principal payments….” 
13 Consistent with this view of the incurred loss model, prior academic work documents significant cross-
sectional variation in banks’ timeliness of loan loss provisions under incurred loss regimes (e.g., Beatty and Liao 
2011; Bushman and Williams 2012; Akins et al. 2017).  
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PCR initiations/improvements might not enhance loan loss provisioning for several reasons. 
Despite their potential benefits, compulsory information-sharing mechanisms may be detrimental 
for various reasons. Foremost among these is the appropriability problem (e.g., Grossman and 
Stiglitz 1980; Gorton and Winton 2003)—the concern that information sharing may discourage 
banks from conducting costly information production on their own. Banks may find it cheaper to 
free-ride on the information collected by others, rather than collecting new data that competitors 
may then easily exploit. This outcome could reduce the effectiveness of banks’ information-
gathering activities, which would lead to an overall deterioration of information in the credit 
markets, followed by hampered lending and provisioning practices.14  
Another feature that can impede the information-sharing benefits of PCRs is the misreporting 
of borrower information in PCRs. Giannetti, Liberti, and Sturgess (2017) find that Argentinian 
banks manipulate the credit ratings of their borrowers before sharing them with competing banks. 
Although the findings are for only one country and apply to a subjective element in shared credit 
information (i.e., ratings), it is nevertheless a legitimate concern. Such misreporting can deter 
banks from relying on PCR data.  
Finally, the presence of contractual features such as cross-default clauses in large corporate 
loans could obviate or reduce the usefulness of information sharing and hence of PCRs. To obtain 
objective evidence on the role of cross-defaults, we contacted our sample registries regarding the 
use of cross-default provisions in their jurisdictions. Their responses indicated that cross-default 
provisions are not commonplace in their respective countries’ loan contracts. Nevertheless, to the 
                                                 
14 Other than the amount of information, the type of information banks rely on also matters. If banks receive and 
share standardized hard information, they may rely less on soft information, which could have serious adverse 
consequences. 
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extent that such cross-defaults rules are present, the usefulness of PCRs is questionable. Given 
these conflicting views, we state our first prediction in the null form as follows. 
Hypothesis 1: PCR initiations and coverage increases do not affect LLR timeliness. 
Even though we are interested in the effects of PCRs, the ultimate objective of our study is 
not to evaluate a policy but rather to understand whether banks’ improved understanding of credit 
risks enhances their provisioning decisions. To this end, we explore the channel between PCR 
initiations and LLR timeliness by extending our investigation of this relationship with a series of 
cross-sectional tests. To understand whether changes in the quality of the borrower pool or loan 
contracts are the only mechanisms at work, we examine whether PCRs’ provisioning effects vary 
across countries with increases and decreases in NPLs and loan maturities. Another channel 
whereby PCR information can improve timeliness is enhanced bank supervision. Credit registries 
provide valuable input to supervisors, who use this information to monitor banks. To understand 
the extent to which bank supervision drives our inferences, we examine how our findings vary 
with differing levels of bank supervision.  
Lastly, we exploit the variation in PCR characteristics to test and strengthen our empirical 
inferences. We examine the cross-sectional variation in the difference between information 
collection and information distribution. The information PCRs distribute to banks could increase 
the latter’s ability to evaluate credit risks, while the information PCRs collect but do not distribute 
should not affect banks’ learning. This test is feasible because, in most cases, PCRs distribute to 
banks a subset of the collected information and because this wedge between data collection and 
distribution varies across jurisdictions. We should note that while these interesting details add 
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credibility to our inferences, we cannot argue that they are the result of a coin toss; therefore, these 
variations, too, are susceptible to a certain degree of selection at the country level. 
Sample Construction and Descriptive Statistics 
We conduct our tests on a global dataset of bank financial characteristics merged with the 
country-specific details of credit reporting systems. The main sample used in this study focuses on 
European countries. We determine that 23 out of 51 European countries have an established credit 
registry.15 We focus on credit registry events that affected these 23 registries between 2004 and 
2015.16 Most European countries had initiated PCRs in the last century but experienced events that 
enhanced information sharing post 2004, such as increases in the numbers of borrowers or lenders 
covered in a registry.  
Balakrishnan and Ertan (2020) describe our data collection approach in detail. We obtain 
the data on credit registry events from two official sources: annual reports of the national central 
bank/bank supervisor and the website of the credit registry. We search for discussions in these 
reports about regulations that led to the establishment of a credit registry, a decrease in the 
minimum loan threshold for reporting, or an increase in the number of lenders reporting. For our 
sample period, we find that 13 European countries experienced changes to registry operations that 
are recognized in official reports. In our empirical tests, we focus exclusively on the first event 
                                                 
15 The countries with a registry are Albania, Armenia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Belgium, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Malta, 
Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, and Turkey. Ireland (2017), Malta (2016), and Slovenia (2016) 
established registries more recently, after the end of our sample period. 
16 Starting from 2004, the World Bank tracks business regulations including credit registry–related events in its 
Doing Business website and publishes on its website country-level coverage of public credit registries. To utilize 
this external database to validate our search efforts, we begin our sample period in 2004. Another advantage of 
our start date is that most supervisory reports become available from the middle 2000s. Our sample ends in 2015 
to ensure that we have sufficient observations in the post period to estimate the measures of timeliness of loan 
loss provisioning. 
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that occurred in a country within the sample period. Table 1 provides information about the 
country, timing, and nature of the reforms we study. We also validate the data we collect with 
regulations cataloged in and registry coverage data reported by the World Bank’s Doing Business 
reports. Table 1 shows that the coverage of the population increases around these events, 
suggesting that these events result in new information about borrowers to banks.  
We obtain the bank-level data from SNL (for events post-2011) and Bankscope (for events 
pre-2010). We use two databases because the Bankscope data ends in 2014 (and does not allow us 
to measure the future ΔNPL variable for events that occurred after 2011), and the SNL Financial 
data for European banks starts from 2009. We limit our attention to “banks” and remove 
observations with missing regression variables. Country-level macroeconomic characteristics 
come from the World Bank’s Global Financial Development Database. The Appendix shows the 
definitions of the regression variables, including the data source and field codes, where applicable. 
Table 2 Panel A presents the sample statistics. The sample consists of 7,953 bank-years. In 
this sample, the median (average) Loan loss provisions is 0.835 (0.466) percent of total loans, 
while the mean growth in NPLs is 0.479, 0.613, and 0.743 percent of total loans in years t-1, t, and 
t+1, respectively. About half of the observations are coded as Treatment and Post, which suggests 
a reasonably balanced estimation sample. The median value of Size corresponds to a figure of 
about 680 million dollars (= e20.338). The average bank has a capital of almost 10 percent, an ROE 
of over 6 percent, and a loan growth ratio of over 11 percent. About 62–64 percent of our sample 
banks report under IFRS and Basel and have a Big Four auditor. Turning to macroeconomic 
indicators, we observe an average GDP growth of 5.5 percent. The mean GDP per capita is about 
45 thousand dollars, and the top five banks constitute 75 percent of a country’s total banking assets, 
on average. 
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Table 2 Panel B presents a breakdown of our bank-year sample by country. Two patterns 
emerge. First, the observations that enter the estimation sample follow a distribution that is similar 
to the distribution of the sample that has nonmissing regression variables. This pattern alleviates 
the concern that our matching procedure at the bank level yields a nonrepresentative sample. 
Second, Italy dominates the sample. This observation is not surprising given the dominance of 
Italy in the original database. However, it also necessitates that we re-examine our tests without 
Italy, which we do below. 
RESEARCH DESIGN AND DATA 
Main Model 
Our main prediction (Hypothesis 1) pertains to the effect of PCR-related information events 
on banks’ LLR practices. We expect banks’ loan loss provisioning to improve as a result of a better 
understanding of borrower creditworthiness. To test our predictions, we estimate the following 
difference-in-differences model: 
 
Loan Loss Provisionsi,t = α + β1 Postc,t × Treatmentc × ΔNPLi,t+1  
 + β2 Postc,t × Treatmentc × ΔNPLi,t + β3 Postc,t × Treatmentc × ΔNPLi,t-1 
 + β4 Postc,t × ΔNPLi,t+1 + β5 Postc,t × ΔNPLi,t+ β6 Postc,t × ΔNPLi,t-1 
 + β7 Treatmentc × ΔNPLit+1 + β8 Treatmentc × ΔNPLit 
 + β9 Treatmentc × ΔNPLit-1 + β10 Postc,t × Treatmentc + β11 Postc,t  
 + β12 Treatmentc + β13 ΔNPLi,t+1 + β14 ΔNPLi,t + β15 ΔNPLi,t-1  
 + β16 Earnings ex. LLP i,t-1 + Θ CONTROLS + ut + wc + ei,t.      (1)  
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In this model, c is a country, i is a bank, and t is a year; each observation is a bank-year. The 
dependent variable, Loan Loss Provisions, is the annual loan loss provisions divided by lagged 
total loans. (Variable definitions appear in the Appendix.) Post and Treatment comprise the 
difference-in-differences model. We estimate this model on a group of banks whose countries 
established or improved their PCRs (for which the Treatment dummy switches on) as well as a 
control group of banks that are individually matched to treatment banks (for which Treatment 
equals zero). Post is also an indicator variable, designed to absorb the confounding effects of 
overall trends in the dependent variable around the treatment. Post equals one for bank-years after 
the event year. (For control banks, this is the same year as the matched treatment observation.) 
The independent variable of interest includes changes in nonperforming loans (ΔNPL), as 
well as Post and Treatment. Consistent with Bushman and Williams (2012), future, current, and 
lagged variants of NPL growth variables are included in the model. In the tables, to avoid 
subscripts, we label ΔNPLi,t+1 as Future ΔNPL, ΔNPLi,t as Current ΔNPL, and ΔNPLi,t-1 as Lagged 
ΔNPL. We are interested mainly in the coefficient on the triple differences estimator, β1. This term 
captures the association between current loan loss provisions and subsequent changes in NPLs for 
banks in treatment countries in the post period, relative to a control group of banks over the same 
period.  
Equation (1) is saturated with year fixed effects (ut) and country fixed effects (wc). In the 
presence of time-invariant country fixed effects, Treatment is not identified in the estimation 
models (β12 is dropped). The indicator Post, however, is identified even when the model includes 
year fixed effects because the events we study take place in a staggered fashion. CONTROLS is a 
vector that includes bank-level control variables: Size (natural logarithm of total USD assets), 
Capital (the ratio of equity to assets), Profitability (the return-on-equity ratio), Loan growth 
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(annual percentage change in total loans), Loan intensity (total loans as a percentage of total 
assets), Interest expense (annual interest costs divided by total liabilities), Cost-to-income ratio 
(operating expenses as a percentage of operating income), and Earnings ex. LLP (earnings before 
loan loss provisions as a fraction of total loans). We also account for additional bank characteristics 
that could affect loan loss provisioning. We control for the type of financial reporting and 
regulatory reporting standards the bank uses (IFRS reporter and Basel reporter dummies). The 
bank-level definition of these variables allows us to isolate the confounding effect of voluntary as 
well as mandatory adopters of IFRS and Basel rules. To complement these terms, we also account 
for Big Four auditor, a dummy that switches on if the bank is audited by one of the Big Four audit 
firms or their local partners/predecessors.  
In addition to bank-level controls, in order to account for concurrent macroeconomic 
conditions, we add to our models GDP per capita, GDP growth, and Concentration (total assets 
of the five largest banks in the country divided by the total assets of the banking sector). We extend 
the macroeconomic controls in our robustness checks, in which we control for the extent of 
commercial loans in the country, as well as the strength of legal rights, private credit bureau 
coverage, and local economic conditions. (These variables are available for a smaller subset of the 
sample.)  
The link between information sharing and better provisioning decisions is economically 
coherent. Mandatory exchange of information among banks would improve banks’ understanding 
and evaluation of loss events, which, in turn, would help banks make more informed and timelier 
provisioning decisions. However, PCR adoptions and changes are not random. PCRs are formed 
to increase the quality of the information provided to lenders and to improve supervision (Miller 
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2003). These inputs imply that we analyze the treatment effect on the treated group, rather than a 
coin toss.  
Our identification assumption requires that PCR events be unrelated to the individual banks’ 
provisioning decisions. In the absence of counterfactuals or a randomized experiment, we 
construct a propensity-score-matched sample of banks that we use as our control group. 
Specifically, for each bank in a treatment country, we find a matched bank (from a non-treatment 
country) that is similar to the treatment bank in terms of entity-level observables (i.e., Size, 
Profitability, Capital, Loan intensity, Interest expense, Cost-to-income ratio). We ensure that the 
treatment and control groups are statistically similar at the time of the respective treatment 
(untabulated). Despite this observation, we realize that a variety of issues might remain. We 
discuss these concerns below and attempt to address them through several robustness tests. 
RESULTS 
Main Findings 
To examine the effect of changes to the PCRs on banks’ loan loss provisioning timeliness, 
we estimate equation (1). Table 3 presents the relevant results. Our findings show that the 
coefficient on Post × Treatment × Future ΔNPL is positive and significant. The estimate in column 
(1) suggests that enhanced information sharing through PCRs is associated with a 10.3 percentage 
point relative increase in the association between future changes in NPLs and loan loss provisions. 
The results continue to hold when we include the control variables in column (2). The coefficient 
estimates on other regressors are typically consistent with those of prior work (e.g., Bushman and 
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Williams 2012); all variants of NPL growth variables as well as Earnings ex. LLP are positively 
associated with Loan loss provisions.  
Overall, the findings in Table 3 suggest that credit information sharing enhances LLR 
timeliness. In an ideal experiment, we would assign information sharing to a randomly selected 
group of banks to analyze the treatment effect relative to a control group. However, our inferences 
face several identification challenges, which we address by performing additional tests. We present 
the results of these analyses in Table 4. First, to verify the validity of a matched sample of banks 
as a control group and to eliminate concerns about the drivers of regulation, we test the pre-
treatment trends in the outcome variable for treatment and control countries. As shown in column 
(1) of Panel A, the coefficient on Pre1 × Treatment × Future ΔNPL is statistically insignificant, 
suggesting that pre-treatment provisioning behavior is similar for treatment and control countries. 
According to this assumption, in the absence of the PCR events we explore, the average 
relationship between Future NPLs and Loan loss provisions would have continued to be similar 
across the treatment and control groups.  
The second column in Panel A of Table 4 provides further evidence on the timing of 
treatment. Specifically, we observe a statistically significant coefficient on the triple estimator over 
a shorter treatment window. This test helps shed light on the timeline over which the treatment 
effect sets in. Note that the evidence presented in Panel A of Table 4 also alleviates the concern 
that information sharing could reduce banks’ incentives to collect information to the extent that 
there will be a reduction in the timeliness of LLR. In other words, PCRs could lead banks to free-
ride on other banks’ information. Over time, such actions would weaken the timeliness of LLR 
practices. If this were the case, we would observe a reversal in the improved provisioning 
timeliness in the few years after PCR initiations. Panel A of Table 4 shows that this is not the case. 
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The positive and significant effects for a relatively long treatment window suggest that PCR 
reforms have a long-lasting effect (even though we cannot conclude that banks’ incentives to 
collect information remain the same). 
We next test the robustness of our findings in alternative subsamples. The treatment and 
control groups could be inherently different in their loan loss provisioning practices due to omitted 
characteristics, which could also interfere with the treatment. Panel B of Table 4 contains the 
results of the tests that get at these issues. The first sensitivity test focuses on a sample of treatment 
countries and thus limits the main variation to the staggered timing of events. This specification is 
free from any assumptions about a control sample. As the first column shows, our inferences 
remain similar.17 The estimation sample shown in the second column excludes negative 
provisioning values to ensure that our findings are not an artifact of unusual provisioning behavior. 
While the tests we present in column (3) are based on a subsample of banks that do not change 
their financial reporting, regulatory reporting, or auditor in the previous year, in the sample shown 
in column (4), we drop countries that exhibit a negative GDP growth. Finally, in the fifth column, 
we remove Germany, Azerbaijan, and Italy, which are associated with modest increases in 
population coverage, as well as their respective control observations. Moreover, as noted above in 
the discussion of Table 2 Panel B, Italy dominates the sample. Accordingly, excluding Italy serves 
as a robustness check of the representativeness of the sample. We note that in each of these 
alternative specifications in Table 4, our conclusions from Table 3 continue to hold. 
                                                 
17 To ensure consistency with the rest of our analysis, we cluster standard errors by country in column (1) of 
Table 4, Panel B. However, we recognize the potential concern about the small number of clusters. We estimate 
the model using country-year clusters, bank clusters, and no clusters (with heteroskedasticity correction only). 
The t-stat for the coefficient of interest—which is 2.01 in the original model—becomes 1.87, 2.15, and 4.43, 
respectively. 
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Even though the tests presented in Panels A and B of Table 4 allay selection concerns, there 
could be other treatment effects concurrent with PCR-related events that could confound our 
findings. For example, PCR improvements might be just one part of a broader regulatory agenda 
that aims to enhance creditor rights and maintain macroeconomic stability. If other 
contemporaneous improvements in the credit landscape (e.g., bankruptcy reforms, the introduction 
of collateral registries) are the actual treatment effect that frequently coincides with PCR events, 
our inferences would be erroneous.18 To tackle these issues and to take into account credit-related 
changes at the country-year level, we control for indices that trace the strength of creditor rights 
and coverage of private credit bureaus. Further, we include in the right-hand side country-level 
stock returns, capital market participation, corporate debt issuance, and the ratio of corporate debt 
to household debt in order to control for local trends and developments. As Panel C of Table 4 
shows, these additional considerations—which are added individually in columns (1) through (6), 
collectively in column (7), and interactively with the independent variables of interest in columns 
(8) and (9)—support our conclusions.  
Finally, we examine alternative measures of timeliness of provisioning. As noted above, our 
adoption of the Bushman and Williams (2011) framework offers several advantages. Nonetheless, 
as a robustness test, we evaluate a different independent variable, LLR Timeliness, which we define 
as the ratio of NPLs to loan loss reserves. This metric is simple and does not necessitate a triple-
differences model; however, it could be noisy, especially when LLR Timeliness is greater than one. 
Following prior work, we use two versions of LLR Timeliness. LLR Timeliness (Beatty and Liao 
2011) is the ratio of current loan loss reserves to current NPLs, and LLR Timeliness (Akins et al. 
                                                 
18 To be sure, the staggered adoption of PCRs mitigates these issues, because, in order to invalidate our 
inferences, confounding factors should systematically correlate with a series of PCR improvements. Further, we 
account for accounting and regulatory reporting features at the bank-year level. 
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2017) is the ratio of current loan loss reserves to year-ahead NPLs.19 The estimation results in 
Panel D of Table 4 suggest that the difference-in-differences estimator is positive and significant 
for both variants of LLR Timeliness, which supports our prediction that PCR improvements 
enhance the timeliness of loan loss provisions.  
Mechanism Tests: Alternatives to Increases in Banks’ Information Set 
Our findings thus far suggest that the PCR improvements we study improve the timeliness 
of banks’ loan loss provisions. We contend that three factors could be the underlying mechanism. 
The first one is learning, which is our assertion. According to this narrative, banks’ better 
understanding of loss events and their possession of enhanced objective evidence make provisions 
timelier. Another channel through which PCR reforms could improve loan loss provisioning is 
supervision (the “supervision” hypothesis). This suggests that regulators, with their strengthened 
access to information, may induce banks to enhance their loan loss provisioning. The third 
potential mechanism is economic improvements in borrower pools (the “better borrowers” 
hypothesis). In this view, bank provisions could become timelier as a result of systematically and 
inherently better borrowers/contracts. This story could manifest in reduced adverse selection (as 
“bad” borrowers leave the market) and reduced moral hazard (as borrowers behave “better” after 
the loan initiation).  
While these explanations are not mutually exclusive, there are reasons the “supervision” and 
“better borrowers” arguments may not hold. Most of our events apply to countries with existing 
registries; therefore, it is unclear why an increase in information (along the intensive margins) 
                                                 
19 Akins et al. (2017) argue that using subsequent NPLs in the denominator captures the essence of Beatty and 
Liao (2011) and Bushman and Williams (2012)—greater timeliness in the loan loss accrual process includes the 
anticipation of changes in NPLs. 
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would significantly intensify regulatory stringency. (This argument should be much stronger for 
registry establishments, i.e., along the extensive margin.) Regarding the “better borrowers” 
argument, it is important to note that our paper does not look at loan issuance or loan defaults. That 
is, our focus is not on the amount of provisioning but on its timeliness. While improvements in 
borrower behavior could reduce NPLs (or provisions and reserves), it is not as clear why it would 
improve the relationship between current loan loss provisions and future NPL changes.  
At any rate, to shed light on the underlying mechanism, we conduct a series of cross-sectional 
tests, the results of which we present in Table 5. We observe that our main findings hold for 
subsamples that are partitioned based on changes in NPLs and changes in loan maturity (both 
calculated at the country-year level). If the better-borrowers explanation were the only mechanism, 
we would find no result for the subsamples with worsening NPLs and loan maturity lengths. 
However, our findings hold across all subsamples (columns 1–4). To investigate bank supervision, 
we split our sample on regulatory stringency (the supervisory power variable obtained from Barth 
et al. 2013). Again, our inferences apply to jurisdictions with low as well as high supervisory power 
(columns 5 and 6). Collectively, alternatives such as the supervision and credit quality arguments 
do not fully explain the results, which implies that banks improve their loan loss provisioning 
decisions by using a richer set of information. 
As an additional exercise, we partition the sample on corporate indebtedness to understand 
whether banks’ learning is coming from commercial credit or individual loans. While this issue 
itself is not a threat to the learning story, it is a useful effort to ascertain the components of banks’ 
learning because the methodology employed for loan-loss provisioning varies across these types 
of loans. For commercial loans, the information is perhaps used directly at the individual borrower 
level. In the case of homogenous loans, such as consumer credit, loan loss provisions are typically 
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made for a basket. Accordingly, the information obtained for homogenous loans is likely useful at 
the group level. More information on defaults, arrears, and other questionable status updates in a 
basket will trigger an increase in the assessed average (expected) risk for that group of borrowers. 
We find that our results hold for jurisdictions with high and low levels of corporate debt, although 
the estimates are economically stronger when corporate indebtedness is high. This observation 
suggests that both types of credit seem to be relevant for provisioning. 
A Global Analysis of PCR Initiations 
The preceding analysis provides reassuring evidence that omitted factors, such as local 
economic shocks, omitted regulations, and changes in borrower pools, do not drive our 
conclusions. To supplement these inferences and assess the generalizability of our message, we 
examine the provisioning effects of PCR initiations on a global sample. We obtain information on 
the establishment date, coverage, and other key features of PCRs from the World Bank’s credit 
reporting database (Bruhn, Farazi, and Kanz 2013).20 This database is a collation of World Bank 
surveys of global credit reporting agencies and regulators conducted since the 1990s. We conduct 
our tests on a global dataset of bank financial characteristics merged with the country-specific 
details of credit reporting systems. Panel A of Table 6 details the introduction years of the sample 
PCRs. The survey stops in 2010, and the latest recorded PCR adoption is 2008. The establishment 
year of the sample treatment countries starts in 1996 due to data unavailability (of international 
bank financials from Bankscope).  
                                                 
20https://web.archive.org/web/20170909105658/http://econ.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTDEC/E
XTGLOBALFINREPORT/0,,contentMDK:23269620~pagePK:64168182~piPK:64168060~theSitePK:881609
7,00.html. 
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The fact that the global sample consists mostly of developing countries and is smaller than 
the European sample may raise concerns about the generalizability of the findings from this 
sample. To provide insights into this issue, we compare the treatment countries in our global 
sample with our European sample, as well as the U.S., the UK, and Japan (untabulated). On 
average, the countries in the global sample have weaker creditor rights and low-quality credit 
information. However, as shown in Panel B of Table 6, bank characteristics are somewhat 
comparable across the two samples. 
We estimate equation (1) on this sample and present the pertinent results in Panel C of Table 
6. We find an increase in the loan loss provisioning timeliness of treatment banks, relative to a 
control group (which we construct based on bank characteristics as in the control observations in 
the European sample). The coefficients on the triple differences estimator are significantly positive 
and are greater than those obtained on the European sample (0.284 vs. 0.102). This could be 
because the initiations of PCRs result in more potent effects than coverage reforms made on pre-
existing registries. We also verify that the parallel trends assumption holds for the global sample, 
and the effects we observe are present for a shorter treatment window (Panel D of Table 6).21 
The global sample also allows us to shed light on the mechanism. In this setting, we are able 
to compare the difference between PCRs’ information collection and information distribution. This 
test helps us further examine whether the main treatment effects are driven by information sharing 
or by other aspects of PCRs, such as changes in borrower characteristics and supervision. 
Moreover, this is a strong test to rule out the confounding effects of concurrent regulations. To 
                                                 
21 In untabulated tests, we verify that these global-sample inferences are rosbust to the restrictions that we 
originally apply to the European sample in Panel B of Table 4. Furthermore, our findings from the global sample 
hold if we exclude (i) the countries whose dates differ in official records and the World Bank data, and (ii) the 
reforms used in the European sample (also untabulated for brevity). 
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empirically investigate this issue, we use the index values in the World Bank database that measure 
the extent of information collection and information distribution. These variables are based on 56 
yes/no questions related to borrower and loan characteristics, such as demographic attributes, tax 
records, credit history (e.g., defaults, arrears, bankruptcy, utility payments), loan applications, loan 
terms (e.g., interest, maturity, collateral), and outstanding loan amount and payments. We then 
replace Treatment with Info Distribution, effectively partitioning the treatment space. 
The results presented in Table 7 underscore the significant role of information distribution. 
Specifically, the estimates in column (1) suggest that the greater the information distribution is, 
the larger the effect of the PCR on LLR timeliness would be. Furthermore, this inference remains 
unchanged even after we hold the collection of information rather constant. As columns (2) and 
(3) show, information distribution plays an important role in the timeliness of banks’ loan loss 
provisions. Overall, these inferences are consistent with the learning explanation, rather than the 
supervision story.  
CONCLUSION 
We use various reforms on public credit registries (PCRs) to examine whether information 
sharing among banks improves their loan loss recognition. We find evidence that PCR information 
helps banks better understand credit risks and enhances the timeliness of banks’ loan loss 
recognition practices. The findings we present are relevant to the accounting literature specializing 
in banking and loan loss provisioning. As Bushman (2016) points out, accounting choices do not 
occur in a vacuum, and we need a better understanding of what causes banks’ provisioning 
attributes (within and across banks). Our evidence on information sharing is one important input 
contributing to this endeavor. Our conclusions are consistent with the notion that bank managers’ 
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private information creates a wide scope of judgment in accounting choices. Even though we 
recognize that lenders can use the discretion in loan loss provisioning decisions opportunistically, 
our evidence suggests that the average lender uses enhanced loan information to make better 
provisioning decisions. In this respect, our study responds to Beatty and Liao’s (2014) call for a 
better understanding of loan loss provisioning practices. 
The PCR setting offers several avenues for future research. We focus on the role of PCRs in 
loan loss provisioning. However, PCR information is a significant input that banks use extensively 
for purposes other than provisioning, which also deserves a thorough investigation. For example, 
information sharing may impact other aspects of the balance sheet, i.e., not only provisioning and 
assets but also bank capital and liabilities. In particular, improvements in banks’ information sets 
could help them manage their regulatory capital more efficiently, leaving more room for lending 
to the real economy. Moreover, as prior work has shown, PCRs can affect financial stability, 
possibly through improved provisioning (Houston, Lin, Lin, and Ma 2010). In particular, 
researchers argue that credit registries may be used as a regulatory tool to alleviate malfunctioning 
credit markets (Mian 2012). Future research could shed light on the types of information collected 
and the characteristics of PCRs that can help improve the functioning of credit markets.
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Appendix: Variable Definitions 
        
Variable Name Definition Bankscope code SNL field code 
Loan loss provisions Loan loss provisions divided by year-ago total loans. data 2095 and 2000 #131958 
ΔNPL Yearly change in the ratio of nonperforming loans to total loans (%). data 18200 #243682 
Earnings ex. LLP Earnings before loan loss provisions divided by lagged loans (%). data 2105, 2095, and 2000 
#132723, #131958, 
and #131923 
Treatment Indicator equals one if the country of the bank reformed its PCR (see Table 1). n/a n/a 
Post Indicator equals one if the year of observation is after the start of Treatment. n/a n/a 
Size USDmm total assets, in natural logarithm. data 2025 #132264 
Capital The ratio of equity to assets (%). data 2055 and 2025 #131939 & 132264 
Profitability Return on equity (%). data 4025 #132006 
Loan growth Year-over-year growth in loans (%). data 2000 #131923  
Loan intensity The ratio of loans to assets (%). data 2000 and 2025 #131923 &132264 
Interest expense Annual interest expense as a fraction of liabilities (%). data 18045 #243388 
Cost-to-income ratio Operating expense as a percent of operating income (%). data 4029 #226949 
Big Four auditor Indicator equals one if the bank is audited by a Big Four auditor. auditor #243684 
IFRS reporter Indicator equals one if the bank is reporting under IAS or IFRS. accstand #132097 
Basel reporter Indicator equals one if the bank is reporting under Basel regulation. data 30700 #225203 
Concentration Assets of five largest banks as a share of total commercial banking assets (%). IMF GFD Code: gfddoi06 
GDP per capita Gross domestic product per capita (constant prices in 2010 USD). IMF GFD Code: ny_gdp_pcap_kd 
GDP growth Current prices GDP growth (%). IMF GFD Code: ny_gdp_mktp_cd 
 
Notes: Test-specific variables are defined in table captions. Controls are measured with a one-year lag. 
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Table 1. Credit Registry Events: Europe 
            
Country Reform year 
Population 
coverage at 
year t-1 (%) 
Population 
coverage at 
year t+1 (%) 
Population 
coverage at 
year t+3 (%) 
Nature of reform 
Albania 2008 0.0 9.9 17.0 Registry establishment 
Azerbaijan 2005 0.0 1.1 3.1 Registry establishment 
Belarus 2008 1.1 23.4 49.5 Registry establishment and significant increase in coverage (non-banks added, threshold reduced) 
Belgium 2011 57.2 89 96.4 Significant increase in coverage (non-banks added, threshold reduced) 
Bosnia & Herzegovina 2007 0.0 0.0 30.2 Registry establishment 
Bulgaria 2011 37.0 56.3 62.9 Significant increase in coverage (non-banks added) 
France 2007 12.3 28.3 33.3 Significant increase in coverage (threshold reduced) 
Germany 2014 1.3 1.6 1.9 Significant increase in coverage (threshold reduced) 
Italy 2009 11.8 16.6 24.1 Significant increase in coverage (threshold reduced) 
Latvia 2008 2.6 46.5 59.7 Registry establishment 
Lithuania 2012 15.0 28.3 33.9 Significant increase in coverage (non-banks added, threshold reduced) 
Macedonia 2008 4.0 28.1 34.3 Significant increase in coverage (threshold reduced) and scope (data on collateral and risk exposures) 
Romania 2009 4.5 13.0 14.0 Significant increase in coverage (non-banks added) 
            
Notes:           
• The Bosnian registry states that its coverage was non-zero at t+1, inconsistent with the World Bank figures. 
• The t-1 data for Germany was missing. The average of t-2 and t values are used instead. Coincidentally, these figures were equal to 1.3 each. 
• There was non-zero coverage in Latvia before the registry was established, due to a rudimentary predecessor called the registry of debtors. 
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Table 2. Sample Statistics 
 
This table presents the summary statistics for the European sample. Each observation is a bank-
year. All variables are defined in the Appendix. For indicator variables, degenerate moments are 
omitted for brevity. 
 
Panel A. Summary statistics 
  Mean  stdev p10 p50 p90 N 
              
Loan loss provisions 0.835 1.431 0.000 0.466 1.927 7,953 
Treatment 0.517 . . . . 7,953 
Post 0.494 . . . . 7,953 
Future ΔNPL 0.743 2.744 -1.240 0.120 3.610 7,953 
Current ΔNPL 0.613 2.687 -1.389 0.090 3.300 7,953 
Lagged ΔNPL 0.479 2.591 -1.450 0.040 2.970 7,953 
Earnings ex. LLP 2.312 3.730 0.329 1.588 4.499 7,953 
Size 20.916 2.071 18.767 20.338 23.990 7,953 
Capital 9.669 5.828 3.160 8.875 16.314 7,953 
Profitability 6.371 8.347 0.750 6.090 14.540 7,953 
Loan growth 11.053 21.998 -3.125 7.111 25.581 7,953 
Loan intensity 67.931 19.321 40.741 72.157 89.362 7,953 
Interest expense 2.194 1.338 0.930 1.800 3.880 7,953 
Cost-to-income ratio 65.726 16.941 48.250 64.640 82.520 7,953 
Big Four auditor 0.646 . . . . 7,953 
IFRS reporter 0.623 . . . . 7,953 
Basel reporter 0.644 . . . . 7,953 
Concentration 75.450 16.331 54.895 74.237 94.625 7,953 
GDP per capita 44,784 21,060 16,748 38,237 75,144 7,953 
GDP growth 5.517 10.404 -8.333 7.407 16.667 7,953 
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Panel B. Number of bank-years throughout the [-3, +3] period where 0 is the year of treatment 
Country 
  In the respective 
database (see notes), 
with no data restriction 
except obs. must be in 
the [-3, +3] event 
window 
In the respective 
database, and also 
conditional on having 
nonmissing regression 
variables 
In the final  
estimation sample 
  
  
  
          
Albania   78 30 22 
Azerbaijan   124 39 38 
Belarus   139 41 35 
Belgium   205 26 17 
Bosnia H.   160 39 33 
Bulgaria   100 35 17 
France   1,681 418 400 
Germany   1,701 423 416 
Italy   4,399 3,053 2,999 
Latvia   131 46 46 
Lithuania   90 4 4 
Macedonia   96 24 21 
Romania   176 65 61 
          
Total   9,080 4,243 4,109 
          
 
Notes: 
 
Data for countries with pre-2010 events is from Bankscope: Albania, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, France, Italy, Latvia, Macedonia, and Romania. 
 
Data for countries with post-2011 events is from SNL Financial: Belgium, Bulgaria, Germany, and 
Lithuania. 
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Table 3. Credit Information Sharing and Loan Loss Recognition Timeliness 
This table presents the results from the estimation of equation (1). Each observation is a bank-year. Loan 
loss provisions is the ratio of current loan loss provisions to lagged total loans. Treatment is an indicator 
variable that switches on only for banks that belong to countries that introduced a credit registry reform. 
(See Table 1 for details.) Post is an indicator variable that equals one for treatment banks from one year 
after the credit reform, as well as the matched control observation. Treatment is not identified individually 
in the presence of country fixed effects. ΔNPL is the annual change in the ratio of nonperforming loans to 
total loans. Future, Current, and Lagged define the timing of ΔNPL and stand for the next year, current 
year, and last year, respectively. Earnings ex. LLP is income plus loan loss provisions, divided by lagged 
loans. Size is the natural logarithm of the bank’s current total assets (USD million). Capital is the ratio of 
equity to assets. Profitability is return on equity. Loan growth is the annual growth in total loans. Loan 
intensity is the ratio of loans to total assets. Interest expense is annual interest expense as a fraction of total 
loans. Cost-to-income ratio is operating expenses divided by operating income. IFRS reporter, Basel 
reporter, and Big Four auditor are dummy variables indicating reporting under IAS/IFRS, Basel regulation, 
and having a Big Four auditor, respectively. Concentration is the ratio of the assets of the five largest banks 
as a share of total commercial banking assets. GDP per capita is real GDP per capita. GDP growth is the 
annual growth in gross domestic product. The Appendix details the data codes and calculations of regression 
variables. T-statistics (in parentheses) are robust to within-country correlation as well as heteroscedasticity. 
***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
      
  (1) (2) 
  Loan loss provisions Loan loss provisions 
  
      
Post × Treatment × Future ΔNPL 0.103** 0.102** 
  (2.57) (2.41) 
Post × Future ΔNPL -0.060* -0.065* 
  (-1.89) (-1.82) 
Treatment × Future ΔNPL -0.024 -0.025 
  (-0.99) (-1.12) 
Post × Treatment × Current ΔNPL 0.067 0.079 
  (1.27) (1.62) 
Post × Current ΔNPL 0.026 0.015 
  (0.51) (0.32) 
Treatment × Current ΔNPL -0.093** -0.093** 
  (-2.26) (-2.42) 
Post × Treatment × Lagged ΔNPL 0.009 0.026 
  (0.24) (0.66) 
Post × Lagged ΔNPL 0.054* 0.032 
  (1.69) (1.00) 
Treatment × Lagged ΔNPL -0.052** -0.050** 
  (-2.43) (-2.48) 
Post × Treatment -0.096 -0.125 
  (-1.06) (-1.05) 
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Post 0.193* 0.218** 
  (1.90) (2.02) 
Future ΔNPL 0.037** 0.043** 
  (2.07) (2.16) 
Current ΔNPL 0.139*** 0.134*** 
  (3.56) (3.69) 
Lagged ΔNPL 0.082*** 0.066*** 
  (4.20) (3.31) 
Earnings ex. LLP 0.089*** 0.109*** 
  (4.78) (5.51) 
Size   -0.003 
    (-0.30) 
Capital   0.015 
    (1.56) 
Profitability   -0.035*** 
    (-7.45) 
Loan growth   0.002 
    (1.39) 
Loan intensity   0.003 
    (1.08) 
Interest expense   0.070 
    (1.17) 
Cost-to-income ratio   -0.002 
    (-1.01) 
Big Four auditor   0.079* 
    (1.71) 
IFRS reporter   0.027 
    (0.26) 
Basel reporter   -0.134 
    (-1.28) 
Concentration   -0.004 
    (-0.87) 
GDP per capita   -0.000 
    (-0.81) 
GDP growth   -0.005 
    (-1.05) 
      
Observations 7,953 7,953 
Adjusted R-squared 0.380 0.417 
Country FE and Year FE Y Y 
      
 
 
 
39 
 
 
Table 4. Credit Information Sharing and Loan Loss Recognition Timeliness: Robustness 
This table explores the robustness of our results. Each observation is a bank-year, and all regression 
variables are as defined in the Appendix and Table 3. Panel A depicts the results from two alternative 
specifications. In column (1), a new variable, Pre1, switches on for the year of the reform and the year 
before, providing a test for the pre-treatment parallel trends. In column (2), the length of the treatment 
window is two years (instead of three years). Panel B presents the results from regressions that rely on 
alternative subsamples, as indicated in column headings. The sample shown in column (1) is limited to 
treatment banks; that in column (2) excludes observations with negative Loan loss provisions; that in 
column (3) removes bank-years that moved to IFRS, Basel reporting, or a Big Four auditor in the previous 
year; that in column (4) drops countries that experience a negative GDP growth; that in column (5) excludes 
bank-years from Azerbaijan, Germany, Italy, as well as their corresponding matched control observations. 
In Panel C, additional control variables are added to the main estimation model. Creditor rights is the 
country’s Strength of Creditor Rights value, obtained from Doing Business. Private credit bureau coverage 
is the annual percentage change in the country’s private credit coverage of the population, obtained from 
Doing Business. Capital markets development, Stock returns, and Commercial loan issuance come from 
the World Bank Global Financial Development Database. Respectively, the data codes are GFDD.OM.01 
(number of domestically incorporated companies listed on the country’s stock exchanges at the end of the 
year per 1,000,000 people), GFDD.OM.02 (the growth rate of the annual average stock market index), and 
GFDD.DM.12 (ratio of new syndicated borrowing volume by private entities in non-financial industries to 
GDP). Corporate debt to household debt ratio is from the IMF Global Debt Database. In Panel D, LLR 
Timeliness is the dependent variable. It is calculated as the ratio of current loan loss reserves to 
nonperforming loans, as indicated in column headings. The coefficient of interest is Post × Treatment. All 
lower order terms and NPLs include the components of the triple differences estimators involving future, 
current, and lagged changes in NPLs, as well as their interactions with Post and Treatment indicators. All 
previous controls include the regressors shown in Table 3. T-statistics (in parentheses) are robust to within-
country correlation as well as heteroscedasticity. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 
5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
Panel A. Timing robustness 
  (1) (2) 
  Controlling for  
pre-treatment trends 
Two-year  
treatment window   
  Loan loss provisions Loan loss provisions 
  
      
Post × Treatment × Future ΔNPL 0.122** 0.116* 
  (2.58) (1.84) 
Pre1 × Treatment × Future ΔNPL 0.043 0.048 
  (0.88) (0.97) 
      
Observations 7,953 6,764 
Adjusted R-squared 0.419 0.395 
All lower order terms and NPLs Y Y 
All previous controls Y Y 
Country FE and Year FE Y Y 
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Panel B. Sample robustness 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
  
Excl.  
controls banks 
Excl.  
negative LLPs 
Excl.  
banks that changed 
reporting 
Excl. countries  
with negative GDP 
growth 
Excl. Azerbaijan, 
Germany, Italy, and 
their control obs. 
  
  
  Loan loss 
provisions 
Loan loss 
provisions 
Loan loss 
provisions 
Loan loss 
provisions 
Loan loss 
provisions   
            
Post × Treatment × Future ΔNPL 0.063** 0.100** 0.084* 0.135*** 0.254** 
  (2.01) (2.25) (1.85) (2.78) (2.28) 
            
Observations 4,109 7,535 7,404 5,798 1,411 
Adjusted R-squared 0.437 0.657 0.419 0.396 0.489 
Pre-trends included and insignificant Y Y Y Y Y 
All lower order terms and NPLs Y Y Y Y Y 
All previous controls Y Y Y Y Y 
Country FE and Year FE Y Y Y Y Y 
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Panel C. Additional controls 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
  Loan loss 
provisions 
Loan loss 
provisions 
Loan loss 
provisions 
Loan loss 
provisions 
Loan loss 
provisions 
Loan loss 
provisions 
Loan loss 
provisions 
Loan loss 
provisions 
Loan loss 
provisions   
                    
Post × Treatment × Future ΔNPL 0.104** 0.104** 0.111** 0.100** 0.110** 0.086* 0.093** 0.091* 0.096** 
  (2.38) (2.39) (2.62) (2.44) (2.59) (1.91) (2.11) (1.89) (1.99) 
Creditor rights -0.038           0.030 0.156* 0.030 
  (-0.56)           (0.47) (1.95) (0.59) 
Private credit bureau coverage   -0.000         0.008*** 0.005** 0.009*** 
    (-0.00)         (3.28) (2.12) (4.25) 
Capital markets development     -0.011***       -0.023*** -0.029*** -0.017** 
      (-4.53)       (-3.78) (-5.10) (-2.40) 
Stocks returns       0.000     0.001 -0.003 0.006** 
        (0.08)     (0.32) (-1.15) (2.26) 
Commercial loan issuance         -0.005   0.003 0.016 0.001 
          (-0.69)   (0.35) (1.18) (0.07) 
Corporate debt to household debt ratio           -0.177 0.014 0.003 0.063 
            (-1.20) (0.07) (0.02) (0.32) 
                    
Observations 7,808 7,808 7,782 7,720 7,716 7,626 7,317 7,317 7,317 
Adjusted R-squared 0.429 0.429 0.417 0.402 0.415 0.399 0.378 0.382 0.395 
Controls interacted with Post, Treatment, N N N N N N N Y N 
            and Post × Treatment 
Controls interacted with Future ΔNPL, N N N N N N N N Y 
            Current ΔNPL, and Lagged ΔNPL 
Pre-trends included and insignificant Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
All lower order terms and NPLs Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
All previous controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Country FE and Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
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Panel D. Measure robustness 
  (1) (2) 
  LLR Timeliness 
(Beatty and Liao 2011) 
LLR Timeliness 
(Akins et al. 2017)   
      
Post × Treatment 0.143** 0.198*** 
  (2.56) (3.36) 
      
Observations 6,984 7,494 
Adjusted R-squared 0.188 0.207 
Previous controls Y Y 
Country FE and Year FE Y Y 
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Table 5. Cross-sectional Tests and the Mechanism 
 
This table presents results from the tests exploring the main findings in alternative subsamples. Each observation is a bank-year, and all 
regression variables are as defined in the Appendix and Table 3. There are four conditioning variables measured at the country level: Δ 
Nonperforming loans is the change in the ratio of nonperforming loans to total loans (World Bank item GFDD.SI.02), Δ Loan maturity is the 
change in the average maturity of the loans issued in the year (World Bank item GFDD.DM.14), Supervision strength is the Barth et al. (2013) 
index showing the relative strength of the national bank regulator (index Sup Power), and Corporate debt is the indebtedness of the private 
sector relative to GDP (obtained from IMF). All lower order terms and NPLs include the components of the triple differences estimators 
involving future, current, and lagged changes in NPLs, as well as their interactions with Post and Treatment indicators. All previous controls 
include the regressors shown in Table 3. T-statistics (in parentheses) are robust to within-country correlation as well as heteroscedasticity. 
***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.  
 
  (1) (2)   (3) (4)   (5) (6)   (7) (8) 
 
  Conditioning variable:  Δ Nonperforming loans 
  Conditioning variable: 
Δ Loan maturity 
  Conditioning variable:  
Supervision strength 
  Conditioning variable: 
Corporate debt         
  Decline Increase   Decline Increase   Low High   <  GDP > GDP 
  Loan loss 
provisions 
Loan loss 
provisions 
  Loan loss 
provisions 
Loan loss 
provisions 
  Loan loss 
provisions 
Loan loss 
provisions 
  Loan loss 
provisions 
Loan loss 
provisions         
                        
Post × Treatment × Future ΔNPL 0.109* 0.102**   0.130 0.065**   0.197* 0.103*   0.123** 0.200*** 
  (1.65) (2.17)   (1.64) (2.03)   (1.93) (1.69)   (1.97) (3.62) 
                        
Observations 3,241 4,489   4,207 3,380   3,622 4,240   5,477 2,149 
Adjusted R-squared 0.351 0.442   0.419 0.458   0.298 0.467   0.402 0.420 
All lower order terms and NPLs Y Y   Y Y   Y Y   Y Y 
All previous controls Y Y   Y Y   Y Y   Y Y 
Country FE and Year FE Y Y   Y Y   Y Y   Y Y 
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Table 6. Credit Information Sharing and Loan Loss Recognition—Results from a Global Sample 
 
This table examines our research question on a global sample, in which each treatment event is a 
registry establishment. Panel A introduces these events. Panel B presents the sample statistics, 
Panel C includes the main regression results (similar to Tables 1, 2, and 3 for the European sample), 
and Panel D contains the results of robustness tests (similar to Panel A of Table 4 for the European 
sample). In the statistics and estimates shown in Panels B, C, and D, each observation is a bank-
year. All variables are defined in the Appendix. T-statistics (in parentheses) are robust to within-
country correlation as well as heteroscedasticity. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at 
the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
Panel A. List of reforms 
Country Name Start Year   Country Name Start Year 
Albania 2008   Latvia 2008 
Angola 2002   Lithuania 1996 
Azerbaijan 2005   Macedonia 1997 
Belarus 2008   Malaysia 2001 
Bosnia & Herzegovina 2007   Mauritius 2005 
Bulgaria 2000   Nicaragua 2007 
China 2005   Nigeria 1998 
Costa Rica 1996   Romania 2000 
Czech Republic 2002   Slovakia 1997 
Ethiopia 2004   Vietnam 1999 
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Panel B. Descriptive statistics 
  Mean  stdev p10 p50 p90 N 
              
Loan loss provisions 2.074 3.425 0.000 1.007 5.230 1,285 
Treatment 0.550 . . . . 1,285 
Post 0.581 . . . . 1,285 
Future ΔNPL 0.358 6.019 -4.760 -0.140 6.370 1,285 
Current ΔNPL 0.327 5.970 -5.000 -0.130 6.110 1,285 
Lagged ΔNPL 0.256 5.776 -4.840 -0.130 6.400 1,285 
Earnings ex. LLP 6.838 8.811 0.759 4.250 14.697 1,285 
Size 21.017 2.223 18.328 20.840 23.856 1,285 
Capital 10.896 8.252 3.810 8.862 19.807 1,285 
Profitability 12.047 16.885 0.430 12.190 28.630 1,285 
Loan growth 22.122 37.276 -12.956 14.955 62.000 1,285 
Loan intensity 51.730 19.234 24.433 53.415 75.074 1,285 
Interest expense 4.811 3.884 1.130 3.840 9.170 1,285 
Cost-to-income ratio 54.562 20.476 31.580 52.020 79.710 1,285 
Big Four auditor 0.647 . . . . 1,285 
IFRS reporter 0.356 . . . . 1,285 
Basel reporter 0.198 . . . . 1,285 
Concentration 72.883 18.325 48.410 75.978 96.356 1,285 
GDP per capita 13,522 19,105 1,130 6,590 44,394 1,285 
GDP growth 9.187 14.867 -7.692 9.722 27.273 1,285 
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Panel C. Main Regressions  
  (1) (2) 
  Loan loss provisions Loan loss provisions   
      
Post × Treatment × Future ΔNPL 0.289*** 0.284*** 
  (2.87) (2.82) 
Post × Future ΔNPL -0.229** -0.235** 
  (-2.39) (-2.45) 
Treatment × Future ΔNPL -0.156** -0.144* 
  (-2.09) (-1.98) 
Post × Treatment × Current ΔNPL -0.012 -0.006 
  (-0.12) (-0.06) 
Post × Current ΔNPL 0.042 0.025 
  (0.58) (0.41) 
Treatment × Current ΔNPL 0.041 0.035 
  (0.60) (0.51) 
Post × Treatment × Lagged ΔNPL 0.047 0.058 
  (0.42) (0.55) 
Post × Lagged ΔNPL -0.105 -0.109 
  (-1.09) (-1.15) 
Treatment × Lagged ΔNPL -0.070 -0.087 
  (-0.91) (-1.23) 
Post × Treatment 0.186 0.224 
  (0.50) (0.65) 
Post 0.028 0.129 
  (0.13) (0.60) 
Future ΔNPL 0.150** 0.143** 
  (2.08) (2.00) 
Current ΔNPL 0.070 0.076 
  (1.43) (1.51) 
Lagged ΔNPL 0.163** 0.142** 
  (2.62) (2.25) 
Earnings ex. LLP 0.097*** 0.106*** 
  (4.47) (4.66) 
Size   -0.073* 
    (-1.68) 
Capital   -0.026 
    (-1.54) 
Profitability   -0.031*** 
    (-4.54) 
Loan growth   -0.003 
    (-1.06) 
Loan intensity   -0.001 
    (-0.10) 
Interest expense   0.031 
    (0.77) 
Cost-to-income ratio   -0.010* 
    (-1.72) 
Big Four auditor   0.013 
    (0.07) 
IFRS reporter   0.499* 
    (1.68) 
Basel reporter   0.087 
    (0.24) 
Concentration   -0.004 
    (-0.30) 
GDP per capita   0.000 
    (1.13) 
GDP growth   -0.007 
    (-0.59) 
Observations 1,285 1,285 
Adjusted R-squared 0.513 0.527 
Country and Year FE Y Y 
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Panel D. Robustness 
  (1) (2) 
  Controlling for  
pre-treatment trends 
Two-year  
treatment window   
  Loan loss provisions Loan loss provisions 
  
      
Post × Treatment × Future ΔNPL 0.251** 0.242** 
  (2.53) (2.02) 
Pre1 × Treatment × Future ΔNPL -0.054 -0.031 
  (-0.48) (-0.27) 
      
Observations 1,285 1,024 
Adjusted R-squared 0.529 0.540 
All lower order terms and NPLs Y Y 
All previous controls Y Y 
Country FE and Year FE Y Y 
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Table 7. Information Collection and Information Distribution 
This table presents results from tests that examine the mediating role of banks’ obtaining of information and their learning. Each observation 
is a bank-year, and all variables are as defined in the Appendix. In this analysis, we replace Treatment with Info distribution, which is a 
continuous variable between zero and one, based on the amount of information distributed by the registry to banks. (This variable equals zero 
for all control banks.) In column (1), we use the main sample. In order to remove confounding effects of registries’ collection and distribution 
of information, the samples in columns (2) and (3) are partitions of the main sample based on the value of an information collection index. 
Both information collection and information distribution are variables obtained from the World Bank GFDR data (the item codes are cr_infoc_i 
and cr_infod_i). These index variables are computed based on whether or not the registry collects/distributes information on 56 different 
metrics. All lower order terms and NPLs include the components of the triple differences estimators involving future, current, and lagged 
changes in NPLs, as well as their interactions with Post and Treatment indicators. All previous controls include the regressors shown in Table 
3 and Panel C of Table 6. T-statistics (in parentheses) are robust to within-country correlation as well as heteroscedasticity. ***, **, and * 
denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
  
  (1)  (2) (3) 
  Full sample  High-info-collection subsample 
Low-info-collection 
subsample    
  Loan loss provisions  Loan loss provisions Loan loss provisions    
         
Post × Info distribution × Future ΔNPL 0.071***   0.029* 0.129** 
  (2.71)   (1.72) (2.37) 
          
Observations 1,285   777 394 
Adjusted R-squared 0.527   0.555 0.535 
All lower order terms and NPLs Y  Y Y 
All previous controls Y  Y Y 
Country FE and Year FE Y  Y Y 
         
 
 
 
